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Abstract
Traditional arguments against the identification of the language of thought with natural
language assume a picture of natural language which is largely inconsistent with that
suggested by contemporary linguistic theory. This has led certain philosophers and
linguists to suggest that this identification is not as implausible as it once seemed. In this
paper, I discuss the prospects for such an identification in light of these developments in
linguistic theory. I raise a new challenge against the identification thesis: the existence
of ungrammatical but acceptable expressions seems to require a gap between thought
and language. I consider what must be the case in order for this objection to be dealt
with.
Keywords Philosophy of linguistics · Language of thought · Generative syntax ·
Philosophy of psychology
1 Introduction
Fodor (1975) introduced into contemporary philosophy of psychology the idea that
cognition occurs in a language-like medium. This proposal leads naturally to the ques-
tion of the relation between this proposed language of thought and natural languages,
like English or Quechua, with which we are familiar. The simplest proposal is one of
identification: the language of thought is natural language. Having a thought is token-
ing an expression of natural language, and token thoughts are individuated by their
linguistic properties. However, despite this simplicity, the view that we ought identify
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the language of thought with natural language has not been widely adopted in phi-
losophy or psychology.1 A variety of traditional arguments, detailed in Sects. 3 and4,
have proved convincing. In particular, it has been argued that a variety of properties of
natural language, in particular that natural languages are learned, variable, public, and
ambiguous, cannot be properties of the language of thought, which is innate, uniform,
private, and disambiguated.
A central difficulty with these arguments, as compelling as they have seemed, is
that they rely on an intuitive understanding of what a natural language is. As linguistic
theory has developed, especially in the last couple decades, however, a quite different
picture of natural language has emerged. It has been one of the driving assumptions
of generative linguistics that these everyday understandings of the term ‘language’
do not provide substantial constraints on linguistic theorizing, and so it is possible,
indeed it appears likely, that the assumptions underwriting these arguments against
the identification of natural language and the language of thought are false. Natu-
ral language, conceived of as the target of empirical linguistic research, is an aspect
of individual’s psychologies, and is plausibly innate, invariant, private, and disam-
biguated. More specifically, these intuitive properties of natural language are better
viewed as properties of the externalization of natural language proper.
This suggests a re-evaluation of the traditional question of the identification. In
fact, certain theorists working within this generativist tradition have argued that con-
temporary understanding of natural language does indeed suggest that identification
is a plausible empirical hypothesis. Chomsky himself has been somewhat equivocal
on this issue, although in recent years he seems to be more clearly promoting this
thesis. In Chomsky (2007a) he states that “[i]t is often argued that another indepen-
dent language of thought [i.e. independent of natural language] must be postulated,
but the arguments for that do not seem to be compelling” (p. 16). However, in Chom-
sky (2015) he claims that we ought view “language as essentially an instrument of
thought, even if we do not go as far as Humboldt in identifying the two” (p. 16), but
later refers to the “underlying ‘language of thought’ provided by the internal language,
the I-language, that everyone has mastered...” (p. 59). Most explicitly, in Chomsky
(2007b), he states: “If the relation to the interfaces is asymmetric, as seems to be
the case, then unbounded Merge provides only a language of thought, and the basis
for ancillary processes of externalization” (p. 22), and this view is developed further
in Chomsky (2017). In a series of papers, Hinzen (2006, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015,
1 With some exceptions, such as Kaye (1995). It is worth mentioning here, if only to largely put the
issue aside, of the prominent view that language has ‘explanatory or ontological priority’ over thought. The
driving intuition here is that language is required to impose a sufficient degree of specificity and determinacy
on pre-linguistic cognition. This position has been argued for especially by Dummett (1991) and Dennett
(1991). See Clark (1998) for an attempt to state this position in line with more recent work in the cognitive
sciences. Davidson (1975) has presented a similar argument for the conclusion that language and thought
are explanatorily inter-dependent. While related, these positions are not equivalent to the identification
hypothesis which will be investigated in this paper. Crucially, defenders of the priority of language over
thought typically assume that it is particular natural languages, understood as communication systems,
which enable us to have genuinely propositional attitudes, and are thus skeptical of the internalist and
nativist assumptions I will be utilizing in this paper. Likewise, this distinguishes the view defended in this
paper from the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, subject tomuch debate in linguistics, psychology, and anthropology,
which claims that particular natural languages influence or determine the cognitive proclivities of speakers
of these languages.
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2017), following Chomsky, has provided the most detailed account of what such an
identification would look like, how contemporary linguistics, and cognitive science
more generally, makes it plausible, and what explanatory benefits would arise from
making it.
While I believe they are lurking in the background of these works, the ways that
contemporary generative theory undermines classical arguments against the identifica-
tion of natural language and the language of thought have not been made fully explicit.
My first goal in this paper will be to do just this. I hope to spell out more explicitly and
fully than has been done previously how the picture of natural language presented by
contemporary linguistic theory shows all of the traditional arguments for distinguish-
ing between natural language and the language of thought to be unsound. However,
while the metaphysics of contemporary linguistic theory are much more hospitable to
this identification than traditional pictures of natural language were, the methodolog-
ical developments suggest the opposite lesson. Whereas traditional linguistic theory
assumed a relatively close correspondence between spoken language and linguistic
competence, the demands of contemporary linguistic theory have expanded the gap
between the two substantially. That is, as contemporary linguistic theory has advanced
deeper and more abstract underlying grammars, it has been forced to exclude a wider
variety of linguistic behavior from its purview. Of particular relevance for my pur-
poses is the category of utterances deemed ungrammatical but acceptable. This class
has been expanding as a result of phenomena traditionally taken to be paradigmati-
cally grammatical being re-analyzed as relating to externalization. Perhaps the clearest
example of this is word order itself: it is near-definitional of syntax that it studies of the
arrangement of words in sentences, and from this it has traditionally, and reasonably,
been assumed that the linear order of words is a grammatical/syntactic phenomenon,
but much recent work views surface word order as instead relating to externalization
processes (see chapter 7 of Hornstein et al. 2005). This increasing distance between
grammar and observable properties of utterances predictably leads to breakdowns in
the mapping between grammaticality and acceptability.
Utterances with this combination of properties pose a significant worry for attempts
to identify natural language and the language of thought. If there are sentences that
human speakers are able to interpret, but which are not licensed by the internal rules
of the grammar, this seems to entail that speakers can have thoughts that are not
expressions of natural language. But if this is so, the sets of possible thoughts and
of possible (complete) linguistic expressions are not even extensionally equivalent,
let alone identical. In Sect. 5, I shall go through some examples of expressions that
generative linguists plausibly view as ungrammatical, despite the fact that they express
thoughts which normal speakers can grasp.
In Sect. 6, I will describe several strategies that the defender of the identification of
thought and language can use to respond to these kinds of examples. I will provide a
qualified defense of the IdentificationHypothesis, arguing thatmany apparent counter-
examples of this sort seemplausibly explained.However, I will point to some examples
which seem somewhat more difficult. I hope that this paper can make clear exactly




Since Fodor (1975), the question of whether thoughts are conveyed by language-like
vehicles has been one of the dominant threads in the philosophy of psychology. For
the purposes of this paper, I shall not weigh in on these debates. I shall assume that
something like the LOT hypothesis is correct, and will interpret it as making the
following claims:
i. Cognition involves the manipulation of representations.
ii. These representations have constituent structure.
iii. Cognitive processes are defined over such structural properties.
iv. The semantic properties of these representations are not, in general, iconic.
Claims i–iii establish the representational theory of mind (see inter alia Fodor 1987
Chapter 1, and Fodor 1990 Chapter 1). Claim iv is intended to rule out representation-
alist theories which centrally posit non-language-like representational media, such as
maps or images. As I said, I shall not be arguing for or elaborating on these claims. I
mention them in order to make clear what the proposal is that I am evaluating, namely
that the representations over which thought processes are defined are themselves the
products of the language faculty, generated in accordance with whatever psycholog-
ical principles govern this system. The idea that the language of thought is a natural
language is of course only viable on the assumption that there is a language of thought,
and so the issue only arises for those who accept i-iv. For certain stripes of connection-
ists (e.g. Churchland 1996) or dynamical systems theorists (e.g. Van Gelder 1995),
then, the proposed identification cannot even be stated.
It is worthmaking explicit that the notion of a language of thought is being used here
in a much narrower sense than it was in Fodor (1975). Fodor is concerned to show that
representational theories of any aspect of the mind presuppose a structured medium
over which computational operations can be defined. This will thus include the work-
ings of the perceptual, navigational, and motor control systems, and any other systems
which operate by manipulating representational states. It is clear that the identification
of a language of thought with natural language is wildly implausible for most such
systems. Non-human animals, from arthropods to apes, for which there is no reason to
posit the possession of natural language, exhibit minds with these kinds of representa-
tional capacities.2 In this sense, Fodor’s broad use of the term ‘language of thought’ is
misleading, as what he is really proposing is a language of mentation. It is a language
of thought in a narrower sense, as applied only to thoughts, that I am interested in. Of
course, it is is an open empirical question what the psychological kinds are, and which,
if any, corresponds closely enough with our pretheoretic term ‘thought’ to be worthy
of the name. This may involve some degree of explication (see Sect. 6.3), but for our
purposes, it is sufficient to identify some seemingly important properties of thought,
and view whatever empirical psychology discovers which has these properties (more
or less) as ‘thoughts’. Thoughts, as I use the term, are paradigmatically personal-level
propositional attitudes.3 That is, they are relations to complete propositional contents,
2 See Burge (2014) for discussion.
3 For brevity’s sake, I shall restrict my attention to such propositional attitudes, but I am happy to include
also attitudes that are constructed out of such propositions, such as interrogative (modeled typically as sets
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attributable to a cognitive agent as a unified whole. Beliefs are paradigmatic examples
of thoughts: agents believe that p, where p is a proposition. Thoughts are also, to use
Stich’s (1978) term, ‘inferentially promiscuous’: they systematically and reliably enter
into rational transitions with other thoughts with a wide range of contents. Paradig-
matic examples of thought processes include both practical and theoretical reasoning:
I believe that p and if p then q, and so infer q, or I believe that a-ing would bring it
about that p, and desire that p, and so I a. The proposed identification would then be
that propositional, personal-level, inferentially promiscuous thoughts are natural lan-
guage expressions. I will refer to the proposal that such thoughts are natural language
expressions as the ‘Identification Hypothesis’ or ‘IH’. IH is thus an empirical scien-
tific hypothesis, not a piece of conceptual analysis or a priorimetaphysics. The model
here would be an empirical identity statement such as the identification of lightning
with atmospheric electrical discharge. We can identify two psychological capacities,
the ability to think and the ability to use and acquire a language. IH is the hypothesis
that these capacities centrally depend on one-and-the-same underlying system; that
exercises of one are exercises of the other.
The other relata of the proposed identification, natural language, will be the focus
of this paper. We can identify two predominant ways of understanding this notion.
One approach views natural languages as essentially public, shared entities. These
entities consist of mappings from symbols onto meanings, and their properties are
largely determined by social conventions. From this perspective, it is natural to ask
how many people speak a particular language. The alternative approach views natural
language as a psychological mechanism which maps one kind of representation onto
another. This mechanism, in concert with many others, makes language use possible.
An individual’s language in this sense is token-distinct from that of any other speaker.
FollowingChomsky (1986), Iwill refer to languages in the former sense ‘E-languages’,
and in the latter sense ‘I-languages’. Itwill bemycentral contention that the plausibility
of IH depends on interpreting ‘natural language’, in the latter sense.4
For different reasons, neither of these notions is perfectly transparent at this point.
E-languages are largely continuous with folk understanding of what natural languages
Footnote 3 continued
of propositions) and imperative mental states (modeled as preference orderings on propositions). See e.g.
Starr (2011) for a semantic argument for positing imperative mental states, and Friedman (2013) for a
discussion of interrogative/inquisitive attitudes. Such attitudes seem to pose no immediate threat to the
Identification Hypothesis, given the imperative and interrogative structures generated by the language fac-
ulty, which seem suitable for accounting for thoughts of this sort. Sub-propositional thoughts, as argued for
in Grzankowski (2015) may likewise need to be accounted for with sub-sentential linguistic expressions,
such as NP/DPs.
As throughout the paper, the issues here turn on as-yet-undecided empirical disputes. In particular, a ‘men-
talist’ semantics for interrogative and inquisitive expressions is needed to identify these expressions with
their corresponding psychological linguistic structures. A dynamic approach, which views the meanings
of such expressions as abstract or social phenomena like changes to a discourse context, will pose deep
problems for the account developed herein. See also fn.15.
4 While I will be reading ‘language’ in the sense of I-language for the purposes of this paper, I am not
assuming that there are no such things as E-languages. Just that I-languages are a reasonable referent for
the term ‘language’ in the IH. If both notions of language pick out entities (as argued for in Stainton 1996,
2011), then ‘language’ will turn out to be ambiguous (as did ‘mass’ due to relativistic physics, see Field
1974), and IH will be true on one reading and false on the other.
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are, and thus they inherit much of the imprecision characteristic of folk notions. How-
ever, there are certain features we can use to identify them: they are few relative to the
number of speakers, people can grasp them more or less perfectly, they are tools pri-
marily for communication, they exhibit significant variation, and are acquired through
a process of learning from others. I-languages, on the other hand, are posits of a devel-
oping science, and thus claims about them are tentative and provisional. However,
within at least the generative tradition, there is consensus that they are to a significant
degree5 species-universal and largely develop without much effort on behalf of either
the learner or other speakers.
In the next two sections, I shall outline some standard arguments against IH. I shall
show how these objections rely on an E-language understanding of natural language,
and that when we replace this with the notion of I-language drawn from scientific
linguistics, the force of these arguments evaporates. Along the way, the competing
understandings of natural language should themselves become clearer.
Before getting into the theoretical arguments against the feasibility of this identifi-
cation, we can note some general features in its favor. Firstly, to some the feeling that
our thoughts are sentences of a natural language is highly intuitive. Carruthers (1998,
Sect. 2.2) develops an introspection based argument that at least conscious thoughts
occur in natural language.6 The scope and force of such arguments are limited, in that
firstly they only apply to consciously accessible thoughts and so may not generalize to
thought in general, and secondly that it is far from clear that conscious introspection is
a reliable guide to the workings of the mind. However, they offer at least a prima facie
argument in favor of the identification of the language of thoughtwith natural language.
Another very general motivation is parsimony. Given that we are already indepen-
dently committed to the existence of natural language, if we could explain higher
cognition with reference only to language of this sort, we make fewer theoretical com-
mitments. However, as with all arguments from parsimony, this doesn’t get us very
far. We ought make as few theoretical posits as we can, all else being equal. That is,
if positing only natural language, and no independent language of thought, were suf-
ficient to account for all the relevant phenomena, then parsimony would favor making
fewer posits. But, the question of interest is always whether all else is indeed equal.
Only investigating the empirical prospects of the competing theories will settle this
issue.
Perhaps more significantly, Hinzen (2013, 2014, 2017) has mounted an argument
that there is a tight connection between what we can think and what we can express
linguistically.7 In particular, Hinzen argues that in many cases the best explanation for
why certain thoughts are (im-)possible involves reference towhich linguistic structures
5 I will largely drop the qualifier ‘to a significant degree’ in the remainder of the paper, but as we are dealing
with a biological object it will be assumed throughout that some variation is to be expected.
6 Carruthers (2002) updates this view, and argues that language is the medium for cross-modular commu-
nication. This would serve to capture the inferential promiscuity of thoughts and would fit well with the
view defended in this paper.
7 Hinzen (2017) provides a different, and highly suggestive, argument for IH on the grounds that charac-
teristic breakdowns in thought such as Autism Spectrum Disorder and Schizophrenia correlate with, and
thus could be explained as, breakdowns in language. In Hinzen (2014), he rejects the existence of LOT, but
only because he stipulates that LOT is a language of thought in addition to natural language.
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are made (im-)possible by the language faculty. For example, Hinzen (2011, 2013)
points out that lexico-grammatical properties of verbs appear to determinewhich kinds
of thoughts we can have involving the concepts they express. Collins (2011) provides
an apposite example:
1. Anton broke the bed.
2. The bed broke.
3. Anton made the bed.
4. *The bed made.
As these examples show, the thoughts we can have seem to track the expressions
available in our language. More generally, the distinctions we make in thought track
those made in language. Positing a language of thought independent of the language
we speak seems consistent with the possibility that a sentence like 4 is ungrammatical
but that nonetheless the thought it corresponds to is perfectly fine, perhaps analogous
to sentence 2, indicating that something or other caused the bed to become made. But
this is not what we observe. Sentence 4 is not merely ungrammatical, but unthinkable.
Note the contrast between sentence 4 and ungrammatical sentences like “The child
seems sleeping”. For these latter kinds of sentence, we can easily figure out what was
meant (see Sect. 6.4), whereas sentence 4 simply doesn’t seem to provide a complete
thought. Does it mean that the bed was made by someone or other, analogous to
sentence 2, or that it made itself (analogous to sentences like “Anton washed”), or
what? The ungrammaticality of 4 seems to preclude an answer to such questions.
This is so despite there being no clear language-independent reason for the difference
between these verbs, or the concepts they express. It is surely commonly understood
that both making and breaking events require some independent force, agential or
otherwise.
IH, however, provides a neat explanation for why sentence 2, but not sentence
4, expresses a thought. Ergative verbs, like ‘break’, allow for passive alternation,
wherein the direct object (THEME) of a transitive construction can be raised to subject
position in an intransitive construction. Non-ergative verbs, like ‘make’, preclude such
an operation.8 The explanation for this phenomenon is controversial and complex,
centering around the claim that the lexical entries for ergative verbs mandate that the
THEME (direct object) of these verbs is identified (‘theta-marked’), but identifying
the AGENT (subject) is optional. Non-ergative verbs, on the other hand, mandatorily
identify both their AGENTs and THEMEs. That is, ‘break the bed’ is a complete verb
phrase,with nomandatory argument positions unfilled,whereas ‘make the bed’ is short
an AGENT. Sentences 2 and 4 are formed by taking these verb phrases and raising
their THEMEarguments to sentential subject position. In sentence 2 no problem arises,
as there are no further argument positions which need to be identified. However, in
the attempt to form sentence 4, ‘the bed’ must be interpreted as filling the required
AGENT role as well as the THEME role it has already been assigned, in violation
8 The term ‘non-ergative’ comes from Collins (2011). The term is needed because ergative verbs are
identified by two key properties (they are transitive and allow alternation), and other classes of agentive
verb can be identified by their lack of either. Purely intransitive verbs, like ‘clap’ or ‘jump’, lack the former




of the Theta-criterion, which states that each argument must be assigned exactly one
argument role (Chomsky 1981).9 The details are not crucial for our purposes, what
matters is that it seems that the thoughts we can have track the expressions available
in our language. We explain the thinkability of 2 with reference to its grammaticality,
and the unthinkability of 4 with reference to its ungrammaticality. This correlation
between available thoughts and grammatical expressions is left unexplained if we
posit a disparity between language and thought, but is predicted if we accept the view
that the limits of language provide the limits of thought. This account thus inverts the
perhaps standard view that we explain why we make the linguistic distinctions we do
with reference to the kinds of thoughts we can have. In the example above, defense of
this view would thus require some language-independent reason for treating ‘break’
and ‘make’ differently, which seems absent.
Despite these motivations, IH has not been widely accepted within philosophy. I
will turn now to the primary reasons why not.
3 Traditional arguments against the identification I: the easy cases
I will examine four major arguments aimed to show that we cannot identify the lan-
guage of thought with natural language.10 As arguments concerning whether two
systems are numerically identical, all four arguments can be stated as applications of
Leibniz’s law of the indiscernability of identicals. A property of natural language is
proposed, which it is argued that the language of thought lacks, and so it is concluded
that these cannot be the same language. I will describe these arguments in order of how
serious a threat to the identification I think they pose.11 In this section, I will detail two
9 For the full details, see Hale and Keyser (2002). Given the overall strategy of this paper, it is worth
considering an alternative hypothesis involving these data: that sentence 4 is grammatical, but is uninter-
pretable (hence unacceptable) for semantic reasons. This proposal inverts the analysis I have provided. It is
conceivable that the syntax generates structures corresponding to sentence 4, but that semantic constraints,
involving our concept MAKE, prevent us from interpreting them. That is, the difference between ergative
and non-ergative verbs is not located in what arguments they require syntactically, but in what semantic roles
must be filled. However, I believe that cross-linguistic data (e.g. Burzio’s discussion of the distribution of
the Italian particle ‘ci’ (Burzio 1986, Chapter 2), which seems to be allowed only in ergative constructions)
suggests that this distinction is best drawn along syntactic lines, as is typical in the literature.
10 There is one other major argument that I will not discuss, namely the argument from non-linguistic
creatures. This argument aims to undermine the identification on the grounds that e.g. non-human animals
and so-called ‘pre-linguistic’ infants, prior to developing their capacity to produce utterances, are able to
think, but lack natural language. I will not discuss this argument as I take it to be basically an empirical
question about which the verdict is currently out.While it seems unequivocal that such creatures havemental
states, whether they have the kind of thoughts which concern this debate, i.e. personal-level, inferentially
promiscuous, propositional attitudes, is controversial. Given the proposal that natural language is innate in
humans, and the empirical data that human infants display competence with linguistic rules at a remarkably
early age (see Yang et al. 2017 for a review), perhaps the best case for thought without language is in
non-human animals. See the papers in Hurley and Nudds (2006) for discussion of the issues involved in
attributing these kinds of thoughts to non-humans.
One possibility is that what makes human thought unique is that it occurs in human language, and that
non-human animal thoughts occur in different languages. See Porot (2019) for discussion.
11 There are certain other properties, such as conventionality or sharedness, which one could use to run
similar styles of argument. For brevity’s sake, I will leave these out as it should be clear how the argument
would go, and what I say in response to the arguments I do discuss should apply equally to these.
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such arguments, from publicity and underspecificity. I believe adopting an I-language
approach to natural language undermines these arguments, or at least transforms them
into empirical disputes concerning the details of linguistic theory. Once this approach
is presented, and its power in defending IH is exhibited, I will turn in the next section to
more serious traditional worries, from variation and acquisition. Responding to these
will require more detailed and controversial claims about I-languages.
3.1 Publicity
Expressions of natural languages are, according to our intuitive understanding, public
entities. That is, their properties are interpersonally available. This follows from our
conception of language as primarily a tool for communication. If I were unable to
pick up on the visual or auditory properties of your utterances, they would be unable
to serve this communicative function. This public view of language is evidenced by
the common assumptions that people share particular languages, that different people
can speak such a shared language more or less well, and that linguistic expressions
are essentially spoken or written (or perhaps signed). On the other hand, pace the
behaviorist, thoughts are private. My having a thought of a particular sort does not
result in any particular perceptually detectable property. Again, this falls out of the
standard account of why we have language in the first place: language is needed
precisely because it enables us to make our thoughts available for others. So this pair
of contrary properties fits in perfectly with our everyday understanding of the relation
between thought and language.12
3.2 Underspecificity
Despite the standard assumptions that language is for communicating thoughts, there
are a variety of ways in which it seems prima facie to be less than optimal for doing so.
In particular utterances often fall short of providing all the information in the thought
they are used to express.13 This can happen in a variety of related ways:
5. He stole them from her.
6. The dictator’s behavior was sanctioned by the government.
7. She put the keys in the basket on the floor.
8. She loved him, and he her.
Sentences 5–8 all point to ways that our thoughts differ from the way they are
expressed. Sentence 5 is an example of context-sensitivity or indexicality. Someone
hearing this sentence may be unsure of whom or what the various noun phrases refer
to, as the referents of these expressions can vary from context to context. However,
in thinking such a thought, there can be no question as to whom or what one is think-
ing about. For me to think He stole them from her, I must know exactly at whom I
12 It is precisely for this reason that Fodor spends a large amount of time responding to Wittgenstein’s
(1959/2009) arguments against the idea of a private language. Fodor viewed the language of thought as
distinct from a public language partially in virtue of its being private. I shall argue instead that contemporary
linguistic theory suggests that both the language of thought and natural language are private.
13 This argument is advanced by Fodor (2001, 2008) and Gleitman and Papafragou (2005).
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am addressing this (mental) accusation. Similarly for sentence 6. This sentence-form
on its own does not determine whether it means that the government has endorsed
or penalized this behavior, but the corresponding thought cannot fail to make clear
whichmeaning it has. Sentence 7 is another case of ambiguity, this time of a structural,
rather than lexical, sort. The sentence alone, spoken or written, is ambiguous between
a reading according to which the keys begin in the basket and end up on the floor
(perhaps in the basket, perhaps not) and one in which the basket begins on the floor
and the keys are placed in it. But again, to think such a thought requires that one select
a reading. Finally, sentence 8 is an example of ellipsis. The second coordinated clause
(“and he her”) appears to lack a verb, but interpretation of this sentence fills in this
gap by replicating the verb from the first clause.14
What all of these phenomena are supposed to show is that certain properties are
explicable only in strictly linguistic terms. Context-sensitivity, lexical and structural
ambiguity, and ellipsis seem to be essentially properties of (public) language, not
thought. Indeed it is hard to see how these could be properties of thought. And so by
identifying language and thought,we lose the ability to account for these phenomena.15
Fodor (2008) makes this same point in terms of compositionality. Thoughts must,
in order to explain their productivity and systematicity, be compositional. That is, the
meaning of a complex thought must be determined by the meanings of its constituents
(i.e. concepts) and their arrangement. However, language is non-compositional, as
indicated by the above examples of underspecified linguistic expressions. The mean-
ings of sentences are typically determined by variable features of the utterance context
in addition to the meanings of lexical constituents and their arrangements, and so lin-
guisticmeaning is non-compositional. Thus, againwe find a property of thought which
is not a property of language: compositionality of meaning.
3.3 Why These Traditional Arguments Fail
Asmentioned above, I believe the crucial failure in these objections to the identification
of thought and language is the assumption that what natural language is is relatively
accessible to our intuitions. There is a folk notion of ‘language’ which does indeed
14 Related, but distinct, worries may arise with expressions which do provide the requisite information
needed to grasp the thought expressed, but for which it is difficult to extract this information. Garden path
sentences, such as “The doctor told the wife that the husband loved about her treatment” provide examples
of this sort. Because ‘tell’ can select a complementizer phrase or a prepositional phrase in addition to its
direct object (“tell the wife that p” vs. “tell the wife about o”), and ‘that’ can introduce a complementizer
phrase or a relative clause, the parser in this case can be misled into constructing a structure which is then
inconsistent with later encountered words. This makes assigning an interpretation to the whole sentence
difficult. As in the cases discussed above, there is no corresponding property (in this case, difficulty of
interpretation) of the thought.
15 A more radical kind of worry may be raised by dynamic semantics. According to this program, the
meanings of natural language sentences are different in kind from thoughts. While thoughts may be propo-
sitional and truth-conditional, these approaches view linguistic meaning in terms of potential to change the
conversational context. If thoughts and sentences have different kinds of meaning, this suggests an identi-
fication will be impossible. While getting into the merits of such a project would take me too far afield, it
is worth noting the attempts by e.g. Murray and Starr (2018) to show how dynamic meaning is grounded
in updates to the mental states of conversational partners, which might lessen the difficulty of mapping
language onto thought even within a dynamic theory of meaning.
123
Natural language and the language of thought 783
have all the properties just mentioned, and thus differs from (a folk notion of) thought.
But linguistic theory, as an empirical science, is not constrained to theorize about
objects with these intuitive properties. One of the central aims of linguistics, just like
all sciences, is to empirically determine which entities in the natural world are suitable
targets for theorizing, and thus to identify the natural kinds in the target domain. And
in fact, over the history of generative linguistics, the working conception of the proper
target of linguistic theorizing has shifted radically away from this folk notion, in ways
that appear to undermine these traditional arguments.
Chomsky’s (1986) distinction between E-languages and I-languages encapsulates
this shift. Chomsky intended for E-languages to correspond to our folk notions of a
language. An E-language is an external, possibly abstract, object. Speakers of a partic-
ular E-language are similar in that they bear some cognitive relation (‘knowledge’) to
this external entity. Speakers may, however, differ in howwell they know the language
they share. Young children, for example, may not yet have mastery of the language,
but they are in the process of learning it, and thus acquiring mastery. I-languages, on
the other hand, are states of an individual’s psychology. In particular, they are states
of the psychological computational system which functions to generate complex lin-
guistic structures out of simpler linguistic structures. My I-language is the state of my
language faculty. Other people’s I-languagesmay be similar tomine, incorporating the
same rules, but they are token-distinct psychological objects. Crucially, E-languages
are individuated by the set of expressions (form-meaning pairs) they license, andwhich
E-language a community or speaker knows is determined by which conventions they
adopt.16 If it is a convention in a given community that “The battle of Hastings was
fought in 1066” is taken to mean that the battle of Hastings was fought in 1066, then
that community speaks/knows an E-language containing this form-meaning pair as a
member. I-languages, however, are type-individuated by the psychological processes
which (partially) enable speakers to identify such form-meaning pairs. In principle,
a single E-language could be spoken by a collection of agents with very different
I-languages.17
Once the distinction between an E-language, as a social object, and an I-language,
as a psychological object, is made, it opens the door to a variety of questions about
the nature of this psychological object, and its relation to both this social object and to
observable linguistic behavior. Once it is recognized that an I-language is supposed to
be a genuine component of humanpsychology, it cannot simply be assumed that there is
any simple relationship between this entity and these social objects or behavioral states.
If the question of the relationship between thought and language is, as I take it to be, an
empirical question about the relationship between two natural (psychological) kinds,
then it is likewise an empirical question what these kinds are. That linguistic science
has developed so as to investigate this internal, psychological object suggests that
16 Lewis (1975) is the classical statement of this position.
17 It is sometimes said that I-languages aremore fine-grained than E-languages, in the sense just identified
in the text. This is, however, incorrect. I-languages and E-languages are orthogonal taxonomies. As I shall
be arguing, certain proposals in recent linguistic theorizing indicate that human speakers all have type-
identical I-languages, even though they clearly have different E-languages. This confusion stems, I believe,
from the assumption of a neat mapping between syntactic structures (expressions of an I-language) and
possible public utterances (expressions in an E-language).
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our intuitive judgements about which properties natural language has are insufficient.
Whether natural language, qua target of theoretical linguistics, is indeed public and
ambiguous is thus an empirical question. There are reasons to suspect that it is neither
of these things.
Qua target of linguistic science, at least in the generativist tradition, natural language
is an aspect of speakers’ psychologies. Thus, even if thought and language are not to
be identified, the one is no more public than the other. On this picture, while the
language faculty enables (in concert with many other psychological mechanisms) the
externalization, and hence publicity, of natural language, the internal computational
system is not to be identified with whatever is thereby made public.
The underspecificity objection is similarly undermined in light of this conception of
natural language. Structural ambiguity, on this account, strictly involves amany-to-one
mapping from internal products of the language faculty to externalized public symbols.
While utterances of the series of words in sentence 7 could be used to express distinct
thoughts in distinct situations, it is a guiding assumption of much work in linguistic
syntax and semantics that the language faculty generates structurally disambiguated
expressions, and thus that this ambiguity is introduced only by the linguistically periph-
eral process of externalization, mapping these type-distinct structures into identical
sounds, markings, or gestures. Likewise with ellipsis. Almost all work on this topic
in generative linguistics assumes that the underlying, psychologically real, structure
includes multiple copies of the elided material, but that some process of externalizing
this structure deletes some of these copies. “She loved him, and he her” (8), and “She
loved him, and he loved her” are thus, on this view, simply different ways of pro-
nouncing the same linguistic expression. Thus the apparent gap between the linguistic
expression and the thought it expresses, i.e. that one but not the other is in some way
inexplicit, disappears. The assumption that ellipsis is a feature of pronunciation, not of
differing underlying structures, is essential in explanations of why the elided material
must be identical to some non-elided expression.18
The degree to which the view that the underlying structures of ambiguous expres-
sions are themselves disambiguated is controversial varies depending on the cases.
Analyzing sentences 7 and 8 in this way is basically uncontroversial. The ability to
account for ambiguities (and lack thereof) in natural language with reference to dif-
ferent underlying structures has been one of the pillars of justification for generative
grammar since at least Aspects, in which Chomsky explains the ambiguity of “Flying
planes can be dangerous” with reference to distinct underlying structures (Chomsky
1965, p. 21). The ambiguity of sentence 7 is thus accounted for by positing two distinct
syntactic structures, one in which ‘in the basket’ is a prepositional modifier of the noun
phrase (NP) ‘the keys’ and ‘on the floor’ is the locative argument of the verb, and one
in which ‘in the basket’ is the locative argument and ‘on the floor’ modifies the NP
‘the basket’.
The worries raised by lexical ambiguity involve the assumption that the very same
linguistic expression (e.g. ‘sanction’) can feature in distinct thoughts. This means that
thoughts are individuated more fine-grainedly than lexical expressions and so the two
cannot be identified. Again, this argument rests on a folk notion of language, according
18 Although see Culicover and Jackendoff (2006) for critical discussion of this assumption.
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to which words are individuated by their phonological properties. ‘Sanction’, on this
conception, is one word with two different meanings. However, linguistic theory has
no reason to stick with these everyday taxonomies.19 And in fact, most theories of
the lexicon instead view ambiguous expressions as involving the accidental sharing of
phonological properties between twodistinct lexical entries. So, on this view, ‘sentence
6’ is really a misnomer, as this does not denote a particular sentence, but a class of
sentences pronounced in the same way. So the multiplicity of thoughts expressed
is perfectly tracked by the multiplicity of linguistic expressions, and the objection
disappears.
This also resolves the worries raised by Fodor (2008, p. 73) concerning cases from
Kripke (1979) inwhich a single name iswrongly thought to refer to two distinct people.
Fodor claims that this cannot be explained if we think in natural language, as natural
language has just one expression here, whereas LOT can distinguish Paderewski1
from Paderewski2. Of course, the correct response here is that there are two linguistic
expressions here, they are just pronounced in the same way (and, coincidentally, refer
to the same person).
The treatment of deixis (as in sentence 5) requires slightly more machinery. On
the face of things, the solution for cases of ambiguity can’t apply here, as different
utterances of sentence 5 involve the same words. Whereas a mental lexicon will list
multiple entries for ‘sanction’, it being more-or-less a coincidence that these words
are pronounced identically, it will of course not list distinct entries for each use of ‘he’
or ‘them’. Thus sentence 5 seems to allow for variation in thought without variation
in either grammatical structure or lexical items, the sole determinants of a linguistic
expression.
What is needed here is a distinction between lexical types and tokens. These corre-
spond to two distinct roles for lexical items in the use of language. On the one hand,
lexical items are repeatable. For language to be useful, I must be able to re-apply the
same expression in different contexts. This means I must store enough information
about the expression that I can tell when it can be (re-)applied. The lexicon provides
a store of just such information. On the other hand, lexical items are constituents of
token linguistic expressions, constructed in real time in the process of producing and
processing language (and, if IH is on the right track, thought). For a given speaker,
there will be only one expression type ‘he’, but as many tokens of this expression
as there are complex expressions in which it features. What indexical expressions
demonstrate is that the meaning of a token complex expression is a function of the
meaning of its token constituents, not of those of its constituent types.20
So, to defend IH from worries surrounding context-sensitive expressions, we must
view it as a hypothesis about token thoughts: token thoughts are identical with token
sentences. Token linguistic expressions are individuated by both their grammatical
structure and their lexical constituents. In the case of stable expressions, whose con-
tribution to a sentence is always the same, the type/token distinction could be fudged,
but once we are dealing with expressions with variable semantics, it is absolutely
19 And indeed whether this folksy taxonomy is coherent is debatable. Kaplan (1990) argues that public
words should themselves be individuated more fine-grainedly than by their perceptible properties.
20 This is obviously closely related to the distinction between content and character from Kaplan (1989).
123
786 G. Dupre
crucial. While sentence 5 identifies a type of sentence which can express multiple
different thoughts, each such thought corresponds to a distinct sentence token. This
kind of argument generalizes to cover cases of polysemy as well. While tokens of the
same word-type may contribute differently to different thoughts (e.g. ‘chicken’ in “I
don’t think you should feed the chicken lamb” vs. “I don’t think you should feed the
lamb chicken”), provided that each token thought is identical to some token linguistic
expression, then IH can be maintained.
This response is similar to, but distinct from, Hinzen’s (2015) response to Fodor’s
(2001) argument that there are elements found in thoughts which are absent in the
language used to express them. Hinzen covers various different cases of this sort, with
different strategies for dealing with each. In some cases, it is argued that the thought in
question does not have the properties attributed to it (e.g. thinking, while in London,
that it is raining is different from thinking it is raining in London), and in others that the
linguistic expression does contain the meaning attributed to the thought (e.g. that “It
is raining” does mean that it is raining here and now as a function of its grammatical
structure). I shall not repeat all of Hinzen’s discussion here, but it is instructive, and
seems to adopt a similar strategy to that in the previous paragraph of emphasizing the
complexity and particularity which must be attributed to given linguistic structures.
4 Traditional arguments against the identification II: the hard cases
4.1 Variation
One of the most apparent properties of languages is their variation. On the surface,
languages seem to be as different from one another as can be. Natural languages differ
in their phonological properties (consider the complex consonant clusters of Czech,
the rising and falling tones of Mandarin, and the clicks of !Kung), their morphology
(compare polysynthetic Yupik to purely isolating Yoruba), their syntax (compare the
strict word-order constraints of English with the relatively free word-order of Latin),
and in myriad other ways as well. However, given the rejection of strong versions of
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis21, it is widely accepted that the thoughts of speakers of
these divergent languages do not show this same variation.22 The way these thoughts
are conveyed may differ in seemingly limitless ways, while the thoughts conveyed
remain the same.
21 This is, roughly, the idea that the thoughts one can have is substantially constrained by the particular
language one speaks. See Pinker (1994, Chapter 3) for general discussion of why strong interpretations of
this claim are no longer widely accepted.
22 The invariance of thought is widely assumed, but it is still an assumption. If one were to allow for
widespread variation in thoughts themselves, this would further undermine the traditional argument from
variation in natural language against IH. It would then matter whether the variation in thought tracked the
apparent variation in language. Of course, Whorfians argue along precisely these lines: variation in thought
is explained by variation in language. For one recent instance of this debate see Li and Gleitman (2002)
and the response by Levinson et al. (2002). But note that even in this debate, the linguistic differences are
restricted to the lexicon, and further that the debates concern what is natural or habitual in thought, not
which thoughts are or are not possible. Due to these restrictions, the Whorfian view argued for by Levinson
and colleagues thus would not pose a deep problem for IH.
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This disparity is what makes translation difficult but possible. If there were no
linguistic variation, we would be able to communicate with everyone. But if thought
itself varied, it is unclear whether communication between speakers of different lan-
guages, say through reading a translated work, would even be possible. It is because
the thoughts expressed by “I’m hungry” and “Tengo hambre” are assumed to be the
same, despite their quite different linguistic properties, that I am able to learn some
Spanish by recognizing synonymies of this sort. Again, these sorts of phenomena do
not even seem to be statable if we identify the language in which we think with the
language which we speak.
4.2 Acquisition
A substantial chunk of Fodor (1975) is dedicated to arguing that natural languages
cannot be the language of thought. His central argument is that if we do make this
identification, we are faced with a regress. Natural languages, he argues, are learned.
That is, children acquire a language by rationally responding to linguistic evidence in
their environment, typically the utterances of nearby adult speakers. This fits in nicely
with our layperson’s picture of language. Intuitively, we learn the language we speak
through various kinds of experiences we have with other people who have already
learned it. This account of acquisition also seems to explain the variation we perceive:
English speakers don’t say things like “Tengo hambre” because the speakers from
whom they learned had themselves learned rules prohibiting this kind of expression.
What Fodor was at pains to show, however, was that the language of thought could
not be like this. That is, we cannot learn our language of thought. The reason for this
is pretty straightforward. Fodor viewed learning as something like hypothesis testing.
To learn, for example, whether one’s language allowed unpronounced subjects, one
forms the hypothesis “My language allows unpronounced subjects”, and tests this
hypothesis on the basis of one’s primary linguistic data.23 However, hypothesis testing
presupposes a medium in which to state the hypotheses which are being tested. And
so if the language of thought was to be learned in this way, then there must be some
further language in which the learner is able to state hypotheses about the language
of thought. And so on. Fodor’s solution was to deny that we do learn the language of
thought. If the language of thought is innate, i.e. it simply emerges as part of biological
development, then there is no question about how to learn it. And it provides the
medium in which hypotheses about natural language can be stated. This maneuver
thus simultaneously showed how learning a language is possible (i.e via hypothesis
testing), and undermined the looming regress (i.e. by claiming that the language in
which such hypotheses are stated is innate). But, this proposal immediately precludes
the identification of the language of thought with a natural language. If these are
identified, we cannot leverage one into an account of the acquisition of the other.
Further, the innateness argument and the variation argument are mutually support-
ing. If Fodor is right that the language of thought must, in order to preclude a vicious
regress, be innate, then those defending IH must likewise view natural language as
23 Fodor’s arguments focused on learning lexical semantic properties (e.g. learning that ‘llama’ applies to all
and only llamas), but the arguments generalize to any account of learning based in hypothesis confirmation.
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innate. However, the more languages vary, and the more this variation depends on sub-
tle properties of the environment, the less plausible it is to view language as innately
given.
4.3 Solving the hard cases
Much of what I said about the privacy and specificity of natural language is relatively
uncontroversial. However, responding to the objections from variation and innateness
requires going out further on a limb. For my purposes, the crucial proposal that has
been developed in recent linguistic theorizing is that I-languages are species-universal.
Whereas traditional approaches to generative theory assumed that much of the work
in explaining linguistic variation was to be done within the I-language, certain recent
work has suggested that we ought view this variation as instead a product of the differ-
ent ways in which the same internal system is ‘externalized’.24 To see the difference,
compare the following two possible explanations for the difference between a lan-
guage in which (some) wh-expressions are pronounced at the beginning of a sentence
(as in English) and those in which they are pronounced wherever in the sentence they
receive their semantic interpretation (like Mandarin):
9. What did Harry buy?
10. Húfēi măi-le shénme.25
Hufei buy-PERF what?
Traditional theories viewed this as a genuinely syntactic difference. The underlying
structure of sentences 9 and 10 differed in that thewh-expression ‘what’ in 9 underwent
movement:
whereas the wh-expression ‘shénme’ in 10 did not:
24 As well as the already discussed differences in the lexicon.
25 The example is from Cheng (2003).
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However, there is an alternative analysis, according to which the underlying syntax
of both 9 and 10 is the same26, and they differ only in how this structure is ‘external-
ized’, or pronounced (strike-out indicates that this expression is unpronounced)27:
These contrasting explanations suggest different understandings of the language
faculty and of its states, I-languages. The former explanation assumes a framework
in which language variation is explained internal to the language faculty, whereas the
latter views variation as a product of the ways that systems outside of the language
faculty handle the products of the faculty itself. On this latter account, the differ-
ence between wh-movement languages like English and wh-in-situ languages like
Mandarin is constituted by differences in the ways that the sensory-motor systems
interpret the generated linguistic structures, i.e. whether the lower or higher copy of
26 I am ignoring the fact that in English tense is raised to C, whereas in Mandarin it is lowered to V, but
a similar story could be told about this difference. In fact, given the assumed impossibility of rightwards
grammatical movement (i.e. away from the ‘trunk’), this is typically viewed as a merely phonological
difference.
27 The example is an illustration of the kind of analysis that I take to be the best case scenario for IH. I am not
here defending this analysis. However, it does have some support from the fact that in-situ expressions seem
to be subject to the same distributional constraints asmovedwh-expressions.Where raising awh-expression
would violate constraints on movement, as when the wh-expression is an adjunct within a complex noun
phrase, wh-in-situ languages preclude wh-expressions as well. This could be easily explained if the wh-
expression is required to move in both languages. This proposal is however highly controversial. See Cheng
(2009) for difficulties and alternative analyses.
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a wh-expression is relevant for commands to the production systems.28 Given this
account of wh-movement, one could generalize and envision an approach to linguistic
variation which treated all grammatical differences in this way, as contained within
phonology, not syntax proper. This latter approach, viewing linguistic variation as a
product of language-external ‘externalization’ systems has been suggested by Chom-
sky consistently over the last couple decades (see especially Berwick and Chomsky
2015) and has been forcefully advanced by Cedric Boeckx (see especially Boeckx
2010, 2014; Boeckx and Leivada 2013).29
On such a picture, the language faculty is invariant across the human population.
I-languages, states of the language faculty partially responsible for the acquisition and
use of language, consist of a computational system capable of constructing complex
representations out of simpler representations. The syntactic principles governing such
construction are the same for all human language users, as are the conceptual/semantic
principles governing interpretation. The differences between languages, which are
phenomenologically so overwhelming, are reducible to differences in the ways in
which these identical systems interact with extra-linguistic systems of production and
to differences within the lexicon.30 This approach to the study of language suggests
significant deviation from our folk notion, in ways which substantially undermine the
traditional arguments against identifying natural language and the language of thought.
As in the above discussion of the division between the grammar and the lexicon,
it is worth stressing that this is not merely a terminological question about what we
call ‘natural language’. The question is a substantive one: What are the components
of the mind? What are the natural psychological kinds? The traditional explanation of
linguistic variation proposes that there is a single psychological system responsible for
both the similarities and differences between different natural languages. The more
recent proposal denies this: similarities are accounted for by the species-universal
language faculty, while differences are explained by divergent strategies for expressing
linguistic structures. The former system is argued to be the distinctive feature of human
psychologywhichmakes human language possible,whereas the latter aremore ancient
systems, similar to those in many non-human animals, which have been co-opted for
linguistic purposes. In this sense, it is an empirical discovery, not mere linguistic
stipulation, that the species-universal language faculty is the natural phenomenon of
natural language.
28 Strike-out, in the tree-diagrams above, is, on this account, to be viewed as merely a theorists’ notation
device for keeping track ofwhat use subsequent non-linguistic systemsmake of these structures, not reflected
in the structures themselves as found internal to the language faculty.
29 For some further evolutionary motivation for this proposal, see Huybregts (2017), who argues that
assuming that the language faculty developed prior to the ability to externalize its products can shed light
on some complex difficulties surrounding the evidence for the dating of the emergence of language.
30 While this approach has appearedmost plausible under the banner of theMinimalist Program, it could be
stated easily enough in previous approaches: Deep Structure is uniform throughout the species and provides
the Language of Thought, and all variation can be attributed to varying principles transforming Deep
Structure into Surface Structure. While this view was rarely explicitly endorsed, one can view substantial
amounts of early generative work as aimed at restricting language variation to Surface Structure. See
Newmeyer (2005, Chapter 2) for discussion. Chomsky (1965, p. 117) attributes this position to the Port
Royal Grammarians.
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Of course, as with almost any scientific development, there will be some degree
of linguistic decision in determining how to describe what has been discovered using
everyday terminology. The purported ‘discovery’ that tomatoes are not fruit amounts to
a decision to adopt a botanical taxonomy rather than a layperson’s culinary taxonomy.
The reason that the term ‘fruit’ can be retained through this lexical shift is that there is a
close-enough correspondence between the earlier and later uses of the term. Likewise,
I believe that linguistic theory provides a picture of what language is, in the sense of
the ability to utilize a system of symbols unlike that of any other animal, which serves
as a suitable replacement for our previous folk notion. Of course, much of the folk
notion will not be retained (e.g. publicity), but neither will much of previous scientific
understandings of language (e.g. rules governing surface word order). A plausible
scientific theory posits the existence of a species-invariant computational system, part
of human’s innate endowment. A reasonable linguistic proposal is that such a system
would deserve the name ‘language’. IH is the combination of both of these.
If such proposals are correct, then apparent linguistic variation does not actually
indicate different computational systems. If we identify this computational system
with natural language, then there is no strictly linguistic variation. There is instead
variation only in the way that language is externalized. This is expressed by Chomsky
(1993, p. 50) when he claims that “[t]he ‘computational system’ of language that
determines the forms and relations of linguistic expressions may indeed be invariant;
in this sense, there is indeed only one human language.” Our folk notion of language,
which individuates languages partially in terms of such externalization properties,
thus misled us into individuating languages much more finely than naturalistic inquiry
suggests. Yet another intuitive difference between thought and language turns out to
be at least a complex empirical issue, on which the debate is far from settled.
As mentioned in the setup of the objection, objections from variation and acqui-
sition largely stand or fall together. Large amounts of environment-specific variation
suggest learning, whereas a species-universal syntax and semantics suggests innate
guidance. In fact, one of the arguments in favor of the view of linguistic variation as
located exclusively in the forms of externalization is that it is precisely these properties
that are available to the learner. That is, surface word order, phonological properties,
and certain aspects of the lexicon, are largely made available in the primary linguistic
data. Syntactic and semantic properties, on the other hand, are not strictly percepti-
ble. Note that this view of linguistics insists on a strict demarcation between syntactic
properties, like hierarchical constituency structure, and surfaceword order. The former
are (alleged to be) species-universal, while the latter are extra-linguistic phenomena
depending partially on the language faculty, but also on a variety of other psychologi-
cal systems, especially ‘interface’ systems, and processes. It is only the latter that the
learner can identify directly from the linguistic data, but due to movement and other
phenomena which complicate the mapping from syntactic structures to utterances,
these provide at best unreliable evidence for the former. Claiming that the underlying
structures are known innately, and that all that must be learned is how these underlying
structures are mapped onto externalized expressions massively reduces the difficulty
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of the acquisition problem.31 Keeping with our assumed identification between nat-
ural language and this computational system, this concludes the case that traditional
arguments against identifying natural language with the language of thought fail on
account of an outdated understanding of natural language. Natural language, on this
conception, is both innate and invariant. As we think that the language of thought must
share these properties, the prospect of an identification is at least still open.
I wish to briefly touch on a possible objection which is not in the class of traditional
worries about IH: the objection from psycho/neurolinguistics. While still very little
is known about the neurobiological processes involved in the acquisition and use of
language, future developments may be crucial in evaluating IH. In particular, IH pre-
dicts a very close relationship between syntactic and semantic processing. If semantic
processing involves identifying the thought associated with a complex expression,
then IH predicts that semantic processing requires syntactic processing. ‘Syntax first’
models of processing, such as Friederici (2002) are thus highly compatible with such a
picture. However, proposals involving ‘autonomous semantics’, semantic processing
occurring independently of syntactic structure, would pose a very serious worry.32
Baggio (2018), for example, proposes that interpretation is at least partially indepen-
dent of syntax. One primary source of data in favor of such a position is the existence
of agrammatical aphasiacs who are able to interpret grammatically complex sentences
when the semantic content is predictable on the basis of the lexical items, but not when
it is not:
11. The apple that the boy is eating is red.
12. The cat that the dog is biting is black.33
In 11, but not 12, lexical meaning makes one assignment of arguments to their pred-
icates highly plausible, and aphasiacs can utilize this information to interpret the
sentence correctly. However, in 12, one needs to identify the grammatical/thematic
relations between argument and predicate (i.e. that ‘the cat’ is the object of ‘bite’ and
‘the dog’ is the subject) in order to correctly identify the sentence’s meaning. Whereas
boys typically eat apples, and not vice versa, it may be assumed that cats and dogs
bite one another frequently enough to not provide a strong cue for interpretation inde-
pendent of grammatical constraints. This dissociation between grammar and semantic
competence is apparently at odds with the predictions of IH.
The difficulty with interpreting such phenomena is that agrammatical behavior
does not guarantee that there are deficiencies in the internal grammatical system. In
particular, it is at least possible that these failures to interpret complex grammatical
31 This approach is strengthened by what many now view as the failure of the Principles and Parameters
approach. In particular, viewing language as the setting of parametric values has led to the positing of many
highly-specific ‘micro-parameters’ in the face of apparent linguistic variation. The number and specificity
of these has seemed to many to be non-explanatory. Given the deficiencies with the most plausible, and
highly-touted, account of linguistic variation within the generative approach, we may be better off simply
denying that there is any strictly grammatical variation, and thereby restricting variation to surface-level
properties. See Newmeyer (2005) for a picture of language variation along these lines.
32 Note that the concern here is strictly with compositional semantics, the identification of the seman-
tic properties of complex expressions. IH makes no predictions about the processes of lexical semantic
interpretation.
33 From Caramazza and Zurif (1976).
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structures are precisely due to failures to map external linguistic inputs onto inter-
nal grammatical structures. This interpretation would locate the failure as outside the
strictly linguistic system, leaving the possibility that the thoughts of such subjects are
expressed by linguistic structures a live option. Of course, it is an empirical question
how such debates will be resolved. One motivation for viewing aphasia as a prob-
lem with performance (i.e. externalization) rather than competence is that production
and comprehension can be dissociated, with one but not the other affected (see e.g.
Friederici 1981). This suggests that it is the input/output systems which are damaged,
as the core grammatical system is involved in both, and so damage to it should equally
undermine production and comprehension.
The variety of neurolinguistic proposals in the literature suggests that there is little
in the way of consensus here. While many parties accept a ‘dual stream’ model,
according to which linguistic processing is divided into distinct processing routines
in distinct neurological regions (the dorsal and ventral streams), there is much debate
about which linguistic properties are processed in which streams. Mostly it is agreed
that the dorsal stream is used for connecting sounds to action and motor control, but
syntax and semantics have been argued to be processed together in the ventral stream
(Hickok and Poeppel 2007), and to be interaction effects between both streams (Saur
et al. 2008; Bornkessel et al. 2005). Both of these options are consistent with the
claim that having a thought/interpreting a sentence requires being able to construct a
grammatical structure. Given that such proposals do not treat syntax and semantics as
processed independently (i.e. in parallel streams), they suggest that data like 11 and 12
ought be accounted for without positing strictly syntactic deficits. While I take these
studies to be inconclusive on this issue, hopefully they point to a further area in which
progress in answering the philosophical question about the relation between thought
and language can be made by drawing on work in the sciences.
Another possible response to arguments of this sort could be given if we have reason
to posit significant disparity between the strategies adopted by the parser and rules
governing the grammar, as in Ferreira and Patson (2007) and Ferreira and Lowder
(2016). If we posit two different kinds of structure-forming operations in language
use, one process following the rules of the grammar and generating ‘deep’ structures,
and another positing specialized and simplified heuristics of the parser and generating
‘shallow’ structures, we can account for the difference in 11 and 12 with reference to
disruption only to the latter process. This would again involve the claim that aphasia
is a performance, not a competence, phenomenon. Aphasiacs are unable to generate
‘shallow’ parses without the guidance of lexical semantic information and associa-
tions between concepts, and so cannot use these shallow trees as input to genuine
sentence/thought generation, whereas they can do this with the shallow parses gener-
ated in response to sentences like 12 which provide the needed semantic clues.
Before finallymoving onto the new problemwith identifying thought and language,
it is important to stress just how tentative all of this is. Positing genuinely syntactic
differences between I-languages is still the most common approach to language vari-
ation in the linguistics literature, even within contemporary generativist work.34 If




such an approach is correct, some (but not all) of the arguments given above will be
successful. If English and Mandarin differ in that the grammar of one, but not the
other, mandates wh-movement, but the thoughts that speakers of these language can
have do not differ, then the language of thought cannot be natural language.35
5 The new problem: the acceptable but ungrammatical
While I take the conception of what natural language is, qua target of theoretical
linguistics, as developed over the past few decades to be more amenable to identifi-
cation with the language of thought, the methodology of these sciences has moved
significantly in the other direction. In particular, while traditional generative theories,
especially those in the transformationalist paradigm, assumed a close correspondence
between the structures output by the language faculty and utterances, the increased
abstraction of contemporary theories has led to a widening gap between these two
phenomena. Significant proportions of linguistic behavior are thus viewed as non-
reflective of the underlying system, as resulting from the influence of a variety of
external, non-linguistic systems.
There are two kinds of gap between the outputs of the grammar and produced
utterances: grammaticality without acceptability, and acceptability without grammat-
icality. Utterances are acceptable when native speakers judge them to be natural.
Expressions are grammatical, roughly, when they are generable by the language fac-
ulty. That these two are not the same has been one of the central assumptions guiding
the methodology of generative linguistics. However, while this gap has been cen-
tral to generative theory since its inception, the magnitude of the gap has increased
significantly. In the early days, it was largely assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that
acceptability tracked grammaticalitymodulo certain kinds of ‘deficiencies’. For exam-
ple, Chomsky (1965) identifies “memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention
and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the
language in actual performance” (p. 3) as sources of disparity between linguistic
performance and competence.36 Canonical examples of unacceptable but grammati-
cal sentences include center-embeddings such as “the mouse the cat the dog chased
caught squeaked”, which despite being formed by perfectly normal grammatical rules
place too substantial a burden on parser memory to interpret. However, this fairly
simple relationship between acceptability and grammaticality has little to motivate
35 In this case, one could defend a weaker version of the identification which viewed LOT as providing
the vehicles of thought, so that tokening a thought necessarily involves tokening a linguistic expression, but
that the same thought can be tokened by tokening different expressions. Language being invariant is the
cleanest way of defending IH, but one might still consider it a vindication of IH if the weaker hypothesis,
according to which minor differences in the vehicles of thought (e.g. wh-movement in one, but not the
other) left the thought itself unchanged, were true. One could thus identify some ‘core’ aspects of grammar
which determine which thoughts are available and the thought conveyed by each expression, and allow for
variation in the ‘periphery’.
36 This attitude is endorsed in more recent work by Tonhauser and Matthewson (2015) when they claim (p.
19) that “native speakers judge a linguistic expression uttered in a context to be acceptable if and only if the
linguistic expression is syntactically well-formed, felicitous and has truth conditions which are compatible
with that context.” making grammaticality a necessary, but not sufficient, condition on acceptability.
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it. If extra-linguistic factors can serve to make grammatical sentences unacceptable,
there is no reason why they should not also be able to make ungrammatical sentences
acceptable.
It was the methodology of early grammatical theory, not the theoretical claims
themselves, that suggested such an asymmetry. Given the tools of transformational
grammar, it was possible to account for just about any linguistic data, and so sen-
tences taken to be acceptable could easily be ‘predicted’ by grammatical theories by
introducing new transformational rules. However, as linguistic theory has developed,
the constraints on appropriate theory-formation have become significantly stronger,
especially in the contemporary Minimalist Program. This means that it is often better
to exclude the observations from the purview of the theory, and denounce even accept-
able sentences as ungrammatical, than to complexify the theory so as to account for
them.37 Trotzke et al. (2013) provides a very clear recent statement of this approach:
“[C]ertain attested utterances are explained outside the grammar proper. This permits
a much simpler grammar than would otherwise be possible...” (pp. 26–27).
One complication in all of this is that claiming that an utterance is grammatical is,
strictly, a kind of category mistake. This is why I flagged that the above definition of
grammaticality as generability by the language faculty is only roughly accurate (see
also Sect. 6.4 for further difficulties with this account of grammaticality). Along with
the notion of a natural language, the notion of grammaticality has itself undergone
significant revision in the development of generative grammar. As stated above, gram-
maticality is the property of being generable by the language faculty. But the language
faculty generates structured psychological representations, not publicly observable
utterances. The operational notion of grammaticality, as applied to sentences, is some-
thing along the lines of: producible via a relatively transparent mapping from the
syntactic structure to a linearized utterance. Exactly what this mapping is is a matter
ofmuch debate in contemporary phonosyntax.Kayne (1994)’s Linear Correspondance
Axiom, which states that linear order is determined by asymmetrical C-command, is
one famous proposal for such a mapping. Some such proposal is needed in order to
make sense of the notion of the grammaticality of a sentence. In this way, the grammat-
icality of a sentence, as opposed to a syntactic structure, is a derived notion dependent
on both syntactic and phonological rules.38, 39
37 Note that the claim is that it is often best to exclude observations, not that linguists have carte blanche
to do this. Figuring out when it is best to revise the theory, and when it is best to exclude an observation is
itself an empirical endeavor, and so the charge that this approach makes (versions of) grammatical theory
unfalsifiable or otherwise empirically unsound, is misplaced. See Dupre (2020) for discussion.
38 This point is particularly pressing given current Minimalist theories which view all sentential clauses
as involving multiple copies of the same argument expression. This view is motivated by the claim that
sentential subjects must satisfy two properties: 1. they are assigned a theta-role internally to the verb phrase,
and 2. they are assigned case properties in SpecTP position, by a Tense head, outside of the verbal domain.
This motivates the movement of the subject argument from within VP to the VP-external TP. However,
we only ever pronounce the subject argument once, despite its occurring multiple times in the syntactic
structure. So the grammaticality of the sentence must be a product of some phonosyntactic rule governing
which copy to pronounce. See Lasnik et al. (2005) for an explanation of, and argument for, these proposals.
39 Because of this, it will often be a difficult empirical question whether to analyze some utterance as
ungrammatical but acceptable, as a result of some extra-linguistic influence, or as reflective of a somewhat
complex phonosyntactic rule. For example, one could analyze topicalization as involving a grammatical
rule of raising the topicalized argument to the left periphery (“That book, Marta loves”) in combination
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With this background out of the way, we can get to the problem with identifying
natural language and the language of thought: ungrammatical but acceptable sentences.
These are sentences which speakers are able to interpret but which are not licensed by
the rules of grammar. The problem is obvious: if speakers can interpret these sentences,
i.e. the sentences express an available thought, but they cannot be generated by the
language faculty, this suggests that the set of possible thoughts and possible natural
language sentences are not even extensionally equivalent, let alone identical. Some
thoughts are not expressible in our natural language, and so theremust be somemedium
other than natural language in which they are expressible.
While the objection itself is relatively straightforward, identifying genuinely prob-
lematic examples is a little trickier, and turns on various empirical claims about
the grammatical properties of the language faculty and the ways in which syntactic
structures relate to utterances. Keeping in mind the distinction between the syntactic
structure and the utterance form is crucial here, as the existence of a gap between
linguistically licensed structures and possible thoughts is only demonstrated if the
utterances in question do not correspond to (i.e. are not externalizations of) some
underlying legitimate syntactic structure. And these expressions may indeed so cor-
respond even if the way that they are pronounced introduces deviations from that
predicted by the grammar. For example, as the above quote from Aspectsmakes clear,
disfluencies may be viewed as creating a gap between competence and performance:
13. I... umm, went to the, uh, to the shop.
While the inclusionoffiller terms like ‘umm’ and ‘uh’ and repetitions are, of course, not
reflected in the grammatical structure of this utterance, deviations from the grammati-
cally predicted sentence of this sort pose no problems for the proposed identification of
thought and language. The thought conveyed by such utterances seems to be perfectly
captured by a grammatical product of the language faculty. The aspects of the utter-
ance which seem unreflected by this psychological linguistic expression are likewise
not found in the thought it expresses, and so there is no need to posit a gap between
the natural language expression and the thought. This strategy, of isolating the source
of ungrammaticality in extra-linguistic processes will be one of the central ways of
defending IH in the face of apparent counter-examples.
This account of disfluencies is similar to the above discussion of the difference
between wh-raising and wh-in-situ languages. In both cases, it is claimed that one-
and-the-same underlying grammatical structure can be realized by multiple different
externalizations. The difference is that in the account of different question-formation
operations, the multiplicity of ways of externalizing is explained with reference to
specific phono-syntactic rules of which expressions get pronounced. In the account of
disfluencies, however, the disparity is a product instead of much less well understood
features of general, i.e. extra-linguistic, cognition and performance systems.Wemight,
Footnote 39 continued
with a phonological rule mandating that the lower copy is unpronounced, or as being an ungrammatical
but acceptable result of an extra-linguistic, pragmatic strategy for pronouncing the topicalized expression
in a location not licensed by the grammar. The status of a wide range of cases, including echo-questions
and right-node raising, depends on which of these strategies is adopted. See Sects. 6.1 and 6.2 for more
discussion.
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following the distinction between the language faculty in the narrow sense and in the
broad sense (Hauser et al. 2002), distinguish between narrow and broad phonology,
where the former refers to linguistic rules of pronunciation, while the latter picks out
whatever psychological processes are involved in ‘translating’ a syntactic structure
into a public symbol. In general, then, when apparent divergence between linguistic
expressions can be attributed to phonological processes, broad or narrow, this does
not pose a problem for IH.
Other examples of acceptable but ungrammatical sentences require a different treat-
ment. In many cases, we can recognize that a sentence is ill-formed in some way, but
nonetheless understand it. Agreement violations and certain kinds of subcategorization
violations provide examples:
14. They is happy.
15. Him told me the time.
16. The child seems sleeping.
In all these cases,we can recognize that somethinghas gonewrong (number agreement,
case agreement, and subcategorization requirements, respectively), but we can never-
theless understand what is meant. Calling such expressions ‘acceptable’ is a stretch,
given that they do sound quite wrong. However, the importance of ungrammatical
but acceptable expressions, for our purposes, was that they could be interpreted. And
even though they sound bad, these expressions clearly meet this criterion. Further,
these examples do not seem suitable for a ‘phonological’ explanation, as given for the
examples above. It doesn’t seem that in these cases there is a grammatically correct
underlying structure which has been modified to produce these strange utterances.
Instead it seems that the underlying structure itself is ungrammatical.40
Do these examples, then, provide the requisite case demonstrating an extra-
linguistic medium for thought? Probably not. Such examples are probably best
accounted for by some psycholinguistic ‘repair’ strategy, which maps these ungram-
matical sentences onto corresponding grammatical structures. The literature on such
parsing ‘repair strategies’ is large, but it fairly consistently adopts the view that
given the lexico-semantic information made available by word-recognition, the parser
is largely able to reconstruct the meanings of expressions despite grammatical
deviance.41 Again, if such approaches are on the right track, these examples pose no
problem for the identification of thought and language. Quite the reverse: the parser’s
being required to produce a grammatical analog of these ungrammatical sentences, in
order for the hearer to be able to interpret them, is exactly what would be predicted if
the thought conveyed by a sentence was necessarily expressed in natural language.
The real problem for identifying thought and language can be seen by examining
cases which seem to involve learning that grammatical constraints can be violated
40 Of course, the morphology/syntax/phonology interface is highly debated, and it is possible that at least
some examples of this sort do involve unusual phonological mappings. For example, one could view Case
as a strictly phonological phenomenon, wherein ‘him’ and ‘he’ are different pronunciations of the same
lexical item as found in different contexts. To the extent that such proposals are correct, these examples can
be assimilated to the previous ones.
41 See the papers in Fodor and Ferreira (2013) for a discussion of such strategies. Arregui et al. (2006)
provide a particularly compelling analysis by showing that the degree to which a sentence requires repair
(i.e. deviates from licensed grammatical structure) correlates with graded notions of acceptability.
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in certain circumstances. Remember that it is crucial in defending this position that
languages are neither learned nor variable: that the language faculty, as opposed to
the lexicon and principles of externalization, is innate and species universal. However,
there do appear to be acceptable linguistic constructions which violate the rules of the
grammar, and thus indicate that some thoughts are not expressible as natural language
constructions. One paradigm case of such constructions are adicity violations:
17. Ivan sneezed his tooth across the table.42
18. Siobhan danced the night away.43
The adicity, or argument structure, of verbs is one of the crucial ingredients in deter-
mining the grammaticality of structures containing it. That the adicity of an expression
is part of the stored information attached to the term is a necessary part of explanations
for a wide range of linguistic data. In particular, speaker intuitions about the unaccept-
ability of adicity violations is highly robust. All competent speakers of English agree
that “Ivan sneezed Siobhan” is unacceptable. This fact can be explained with reference
to the shared knowledge that ‘sneeze’ is an intransitive verb, and thus cannot take a
direct object. However, as Goldberg and Jackendoff, and others in the construction
grammar tradition, argue, speakers are able to learn, via certain kinds of analogical
processes, that there are constructions in which these verbs function differently. If
the adicity of these expressions goes into determining which structures are genera-
ble by the language faculty, then the ability to interpret these constructions seems to
require the ability to have thoughts that are not constructible within the confines of
grammatical principles.44
A similar kind of worry comes from apparently interpretable violations of syntactic
constraints. Consider:
19. This is the department which employs a teacher who speaks every language.45
To my ear, this sentence is ambiguous. On one reading, the identified department
employs at least one amazingly gifted linguist capable of speaking every human lan-
guage. On the other, it makes the much more modest, but still impressive, claim that
each human language is spoken by at least some teacher in the department, although it
42 From Goldberg (2006).
43 From Jackendoff (2018).
44 As in the other cases, what adicity violations show about the relation between thought and language
depends on a variety of empirical assumptions. In particular, the problem raised in this section depends on
the assumption that expressions like ‘sneeze’ and ‘dance’ are represented in the lexicon with their usual
argument structures (i.e. as intranstive). If one relaxed this assumption, and allowed the lexicon to contain
multiple argument structures for these expressions, or allowed ‘on-the-fly’ additions to the lexicon which
accounted for sentences like 17 and 18, then these sentences would no longer count as ungrammatical. The
motivation for the constructionist approach, however, depends on this assumption. Constructionists view
our linguistic abilities with sentences like these to depend on the acquisition of complex constructions, into
which particular lexical items can be placed, rather than on learning novel argument structures for particular
expressions.
45 Pietroski and Hornstein (2002) discuss related examples, such as “Mary believes that everyone who saw
the richest man is happy”. That inverted pseudo-clefts, in which the subordinated relative clause is found
after the focused object, seem to allow movement out of locations where it is normally prohibited (e.g.
relative clauses as in 19) is noted by Chung and McCloskey (1983) and examples of this sort are noted by
Phillips (2013a) as problems for the view that island-effects are grammatical phenomena sensu stricto.
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may be that no teachers speak all of the languages. While this second reading may be a
little unnatural, it is, I believe, available, and informal polling has supported this. This
poses another problem for the claim that thoughts are expressed in natural language.
This is because this reading seems to involve interpreting the quantified noun phrase
‘every language’ as taking wide scope over ‘a teacher’.
On standard grammatical assumptions, going back to May (1985), quantifier scope
is determined by relations of C-command after raising the quantifier expressions to
the left-periphery of the expression. In order to get this second reading, then, ‘every
language’ must be attached to the root of the syntactic structure after ‘a teacher’ is
raised. The problem is that there are principled reasons to deny that ‘every language’
can be raised at all. Going back to Ross (1967), relative clauses have been viewed
as ‘islands’: expressions which prevent extraction. This ‘relative clause constraint’
explains why the following question is ungrammatical and thus unacceptable:
20. *Which language did the department employ a teacher who speaks?
The attempt to raise the wh-expression ‘which language’ from the relative clause ‘who
speaks which language’ results in ungrammaticality and thus unacceptability due to
this island constraint. But why then are we able to raise the quantifier expression out
of this clause in order to get the reading of sentence 19 wherein ‘every language’ takes
wide scope? It seems we must be able to interpret this sentence despite the fact that
the sentence expressing it (under this reading) violates the grammatical constraints
imposed by our grammar. Thus we can think a thought our natural language cannot
represent.
An analogy could be made here to learning an artificial language, such as a formal
logic. Such languages are not consistent with the principles of natural language gram-
mar, and thus cannot be acquired in the normalway that we acquire a (first) language.46
They seem instead to be acquired through the use of more general psychological tools
of inference, memorization, and extrapolation. Likewise it seems that, alongside the
development of our natural language, we can acquire, through these more general
learning processes, a variety of additions and exceptions to the grammatical principles
governing the construction of natural language expressions. If these additions gen-
uinely increase the set of thoughts that one can have, then the language of thought is
not reducible to natural language. I believe the cases just described present the best
case against this proposed identification.
6 Solution strategies
While I take the problem of acceptable but ungrammatical expressions to be a serious
barrier to identifying thought and language, there are strategies that can be used in
the attempt to explain away these difficulties. The first two of these, phonological
explanations and repair strategies, we saw in the previous section. These aim to show
46 Note that this fact is not sufficient on its own to show that natural language is not the language of thought,
as it is possible that we learn an artificial language by learning to translate its expressions into expressions




that, while the acceptable utterances may appear to violate the grammatical principles
governing the language faculty, they may nonetheless be suitably related to an under-
lying legitimate structure. As IH says only that thoughts are expressed by the outputs
of the language faculty, as long as our interpretation of these utterances is given by
these underlying grammatical structures, such expressions do not pose a problem for
this proposal. After elaborating on these strategies, I will turn to two more responses
to the argument from acceptable but ungrammatical expressions. The first will involve
claiming that the ‘thoughts’ grasped in interpreting these ungrammatical expressions
may be quite unlike those grasped when we grasp grammatical thoughts, perhaps on
analogy with the representational capacities of non-human animals. The second will
draw a distinction between ways in which expressions can be deemed ungrammatical
by the language faculty, and argue that only one of these ways poses a problem for IH.
If all of the remaining apparent cases of acceptable but ungrammatical expressions
are ungrammatical in this way, the hypothesis may be saved.
6.1 Complicate themorphophonology
As I have argued, the central development in linguistic theory which has made the
revitalization of IH plausible is the distinction between the core processes of the com-
putational linguistic system and the processes of externalization recruited to publicize
the structured representations made available by this system. As several cases above
made clear, this distinction is crucial in accounting for apparent linguistic diversity
without committing to the claim that the underlying linguistic system, the natural
language according to the proposal advocated in this paper, itself varies between
speakers. The apparent difference between wh-in-situ and wh-movement languages
can be accounted for with reference to different externalization strategies, and so the
thesis that the syntactic/semantic properties of these languages are identical can be
retained. If phonological processing of this sort is indeed peripheral, or subsidiary, to
the core operations of language, this is an argument that English and Mandarin speak-
ers really do speak the same ‘language’, in this technical sense. This thus undermines
the argument against IH which claims that languages vary in ways that thoughts do
not.
This raises the possibility that the examples of ungrammatical but acceptable expres-
sions claimed to pose a problem for this identification can be handled in a similar way.
On such a proposal, learned constructions ought be viewed as acquired conventions
about phonology, not syntax. That is, sentences like 17 and 18 could be analyzed as
learned ‘pronunciations’ of grammatically acceptable expressions, such as:
21. Ivan sneezed and thereby caused his tooth to move across the room.
22. Siobhan danced until the night was over.
If 17 and 18 have the same underlying structure as 21 and 22 respectively and differ
only in the way this structure is mapped onto an externalized production, then their
acceptability can be explained with reference to this structure, which is presumably
generable by the language faculty. Thus the problem for IH disappears: no thought is
available beyond those made so by the language faculty.
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How plausible such a strategy is is a vexed empirical question, depending on
complex issues concerning the relation between morphology, syntax, and phonology.
Viewing surface forms as derived from apparently very different underlying structures
is, however, a very familiar idea in these literatures, within the programs of lexical
decomposition (e.g. Wierzbicka 1996; Jackendoff 1996), lexical semantics (e.g. Hale
and Keyser 2002; Pustejovsky 1991) and distributed morphology (Halle and Marantz
1994).47 Sentences like 21 and 22, as candidates for more transparent representations
of the structures underlying 17 and 18, are in line with the general thrust of such
approaches, which assume that it is only semantically “general” expressions such as
‘cause’ or ‘until’ which can be featured in the underlying representations without
being pronounced.
Cross-linguistic work such as Dixon (2000) has shown that languages appear to
vary in whether they allow causative constructions like 17 and 18, or whether the
causality must be encoded with a causative morpheme. Japanese, for example, has a
productive morphological rule for transforming a verb (e.g. ‘agaru’ to go up becomes
‘ageru’ to raise i.e. to cause to go up). That causality must be marked in surface
structure in many languages provides some motivation for viewing causatives like 17
as simply the English strategy for externalizing what is, in its grammatical structure,
akin to 21, and a similar cross-linguistic story could be told for resultative constructions
like 18. Further work by Papafragou et al. (2002), building on discussions of Talmy
(1988), has shown that while the surface properties of languages may vary in the
ways they encode things like motion, this does not seem to influence other, non-
linguistic, cognitive processes such as recall. This again is compatible with the theory
here developed. If the differences between languages are restricted to mappings from
thoughts to sensory-motor systems, we would predict that there would be no influence
of ‘linguistic variation’ on other cognitive systems.
6.2 Repair
A closely related strategy is that of repair. Instead of viewing such anomalous (from
the perspective of grammatical theory) expressions as opaque phonological mappings
from underlying grammatical structures to externalized expressions, we can treat such
utterances as genuinely ungrammatical (i.e. not products of normal phono-syntactic
and phono-morphological rules applied to the products of the language faculty) but
posits mechanisms by which they are ‘translated into’ grammatical expressions which
can then be interpreted to give the contents of the thoughts.48
Which structures such processes produce is another empirical question, but the
structures underlying sentences like 21 and 22 again seem like plausible candidates.
This strategy and the previous one may well shade into one another, depending on
how parsing (and production) mechanisms relate to the posits of phonological and
morphological theory. If these ‘performance systems’ utilize the rules of the latter
47 Although see Fodor and Lepore (1999) for a somewhat iconoclastic rejection of all such approaches.
48 Some suggestive results inFriederici et al. (2006) suggest neurophysiological specializations for respond-




theories, as argued for in Phillips (2004, 2013b) and Phillips et al. (2011), then there
may be no difference: ‘repair’ would just amount to the application of such rules to
public symbols so as to reproduce the grammatical structures from which they derive.
If, on the other hand, parsing mechanisms utilize quite different strategies, perhaps
the heuristics of Ferreira and Patson (2007), then there will be a clean divide between
them.
While I believe these two strategies are plausibly the best bet for defenders of IH,
there are serious obstacles to application of these strategies. The most serious is the
overgeneration problem. Positing a repair strategy or phonological process by which
apparently ungrammatical utterances can be mapped onto grammatical underlying
structures is liable to overgenerate, and predict that expressions which are in fact
unacceptable would be legitimized by these very processes. That is, one must ensure
that any proposed strategies for exacting themapping from acceptable but ungrammat-
ical expressions to grammatical structures does not also suffice to map unacceptable
expressions to grammatical structures.
For example, one possible strategy for ‘repairing’ adicity violations such as sen-
tences 17 and 18would be that rather than identifying the (usual) argument structure of
the identified verb, and thus precluding the generation of a structure with the intended
number of arguments, the parser first identifies the intended argument structure and
creates a ‘verbal skeleton’, which has the right argument structure but with a dummy
variable where the verb should be:
23. Ivan V his tooth across the table.
24. Siobhan V NP away.
These are perfectly normal grammatical structures (cf. “Ivan pushed his tooth across
the table” and “Siobhan gave her money away”). The offending expressions, which
can’t typically be found in structures of this sort, can then be late-inserted and coerced
into taking on the transitive meanings intended.
The difficulty with this is that it is unclear how to prevent overgeneration, predicting
that sentences which are in fact unacceptable could be salvaged in these ways.49 For
example, Jackendoff (1997) describes a wide range of constructions closely analogous
to sentence 18 that seem semantically plausible but which are nonetheless unaccept-
able. Consider, for example:
25. *Siobhan danced the Tango the night away.
26. *Siobhan danced happily the night away.
Likewise:
27. *Ivan sneezed violently his tooth across the table.
In all these cases, we can understand what these sentences would mean, but they
are clearly bad. The difficulty then is explaining why such a repair strategy cannot
likewise be used to salvage these expressions. If ‘dance’ and ‘sneeze’ can be treated
as transitive verbs, why is this impossible for ‘dance the Tango’, ‘dance happily’ and
‘sneeze violently’? Of course, there are things one can say about such constraints. It
49 It is also inconsistentwith standardMinimalist assumptions that there is no grammatical structure beyond
the Merging of lexical items.
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appears that these constructions allow this sort of coercion to apply only to verbal
heads, not to VPs. This fact must itself be explained however: if pragmatic strategies
allow for the mapping of ungrammatical expressions onto grammatical structures in
the case of 17 and 18, why can similar processes not apply to 25–27?
It is worth noting that accounting for these examples in this way would not merely
defend IH from this objection, but would provide positive support for it. In line with
Hinzen’s arguments discussed above, if interpretation of an utterance requires that
we ‘translate’ it, mapping it onto a grammatical expression, this reinforces the idea
that there is a one-to-one mapping between possible thoughts and possible grammat-
ical expressions, as predicted by IH. It is not always noted that the assumption that
ungrammatical sentences must be repaired in order to be understood itself requires
explanation and justification. If we can grasp thoughts which are not expressed by
grammatical sentences, then we might expect some ungrammatical sentences to be
understood ‘directly’, i.e. by mapping them onto the LOT (where this is assumed to
be distinct from natural languages) without repairing them. If we discover that such
repairs are indeed always required, this provides strong evidence that understanding
a sentence, i.e. grasping the thought it expresses, simply is constructing a natural
language expression.
Examples like 19 may present even more serious overgeneration worries. Any
strategy which loosens the constraint on extraction from relative clauses so as to
allow for the ambiguity of 19 must not thereby predict that 20 is acceptable. One
could propose that some repair strategy enables us to loosen the locality constraints
on quantifier raising (but crucially not on wh-movement). However, this proposal
similarly overgenerates:
28. It was a man who told me that every philosopher loves Frege.
Despite featuring a cleft construction which appears to avoid the constraints on move-
ment in the cases above, this sentence is not ambiguous. It cannot be read as claiming
that every philosopher is such that a man (read specifically or non-specifically) told me
that they loved Frege. That is, one cannot read the embedded ‘every philosopher’ as
scoping out of the that-clause and over the focused matrix subject ‘a man’. Proponents
of the repair strategymust not posit repair mechanisms for 19 which also predict scope
ambiguities in 28.
6.3 Different kinds of thought
As Hinzen (2013, Sect. 7) points out, claiming that human thought occurs in natural
language does not preclude the possibility that non-human (and thus non-linguistic)
animals engage in some forms of ‘thought’. The crucial idea behind IH is that human
thought, as expressed by the structures of natural language, forms a natural psycho-
logical kind. This is consistent with there being many other kinds of psychological
representation. Indeed, it is clear that the representational formats of large parts of
cognition, such as vision (see e.g. Palmer 1999) or map-like locational representation
(e.g. Camp 2007) are quite unlike expressions of natural language. One option for
defending IH, then, is allowing that we can interpret ungrammatical sentences, and
that we do sowithout mapping them onto grammatical structures, but that this involves
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a quite different kind of cognition than that used when we understand grammatical
sentences. On this proposal, identifying thought and language is a kind of ‘explication’
in something like the sense of Carnap (1962): natural language expressions are the
vehicles for a substantial amount of what is pretheoretically called ‘thought’, the class
of natural language expressions forms a natural kind, and this class includes many of
the ‘core cases’ of our pretheoretic notion, and thus we are justified in revising our
conception of thought in line with this hypothesis.
It is, I assume, an empirical possibility that the everyday notion of ‘thought’ does
not pick out a uniform psychological phenomenon (beyond the heterogeneity usually
assumed by this term in philosophical discussions, which apply it to distinct psycho-
logical kinds like belief, desire, intention, etc.). There are several options we could
take in response to such a discovery. One would be eliminativist, eschewing talk of
thoughts altogether. Of course this would preclude IH. The proposal just sketched,
however, would instead select some subset of the things we antecedently viewed as
thoughts, and treat that as the extension of our new, scientifically useful, concept. If,
for example, sentence interpretation in general turned out to centrally involve the con-
struction of a syntactic structure in line with the constraints of Universal Grammar, but
that in certain rare cases, when such a strategy was unavailable, interpreters resorted
to the construction of a different kind of psychological structure, it may be defensible
to hold onto IH by viewing only the former as the extension of the new, explicated,
notion of ‘thought’. Of course, how plausible/appropriate this linguistic maneuver is
will depend on how much, and in particular how many of the ‘core cases’, of our tra-
ditional notion of ‘thought’ is covered by these linguistic structures. If non-linguistic
interpretations are common and paradigmatic instances of thought, this explication
will amount to little more than a stipulation of the truth of IH. If, however, exceptions
are quirky and unusual, IH could be viewed as a genuine kind identity, and explication
would thus be useful. Relatedly, if work on animal cognition suggests a close corre-
spondence between animal and human cognition, this would pose a problem for such
an explication of ‘thought’, as non-human animal thought, we are assuming, is not
structured linguistically.
As above, this strategy is more plausible for some phenomena than others. In par-
ticular, it is often thought that non-linguistic representational media are very bad at
expressing certain sorts of ‘logical’ content. Quantifiers, negation, disjunction, etc.
seem difficult to express without language. This suggests that such an approach is
unlikely to be of much use in handling the recalcitrant sentence 19.
6.4 Filters versus ungenerable expressions
The final possible response involves distinguishing between two ways in which an
expression can be deemed ‘ungrammatical’. Some expressions are ungrammatical
on account of not being generable at all by the language faculty, whereas others are
ungrammatical in virtue of violating some constraint on what the outputs of the lan-
guage faculty must be like. This distinction largely originated with Chomsky and
Lasnik (1977), and was then incorporated as one of the main features of Government
and Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981). Traditional GB theory included general con-
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straints on what kinds of structures could be produced (centrally, X-bar Theory and
the sole transformational rule ‘move α’), as well as a collection of ‘filters’, which
served to further limit the set of acceptable expressions by excluding those structures
which, though generated in a perfectly legitimate way, had some illegitimate property.
Perhaps the most famous example of the latter is the Case Filter, which states that
all overt NPs must be assigned Case. This constraint on grammaticality is posited in
order to account for, inter alia, cases like the following:
29. *(It) seems the child to be sleeping.
30. The child seems to be sleeping.
For various reasons50, it is important that grammatical theory not preclude the language
faculty from generating structures like 29. However, it is clearly unacceptable. The
Case Filter provides an explanation for this. Infinitive verbs (‘to be sleeping’) do
not assign Case properties to their arguments. As ‘the child’ is the overt subject of
this expression in 29, the Case Filter rules it out. This further explains why we find
sentences like 30 in English. Because the embedded verb can’t assign Case to the NP,
the NP must move to the higher, tensed, verb, which can. This movement occurs even
though ‘the child’ is the semantic argument of ‘sleeping’, and not of ‘seems’. In 30,
then, the overt NP is assigned Case, and so the filter is not violated and the sentence
is grammatical, and thus acceptable.
The crucial point about this for our purposes is that, despite our ability to recognize
sentence 29 as unacceptable, we do knowwhat it means. This fact can be accounted for
within the confines of IH if it is allowed that thoughts canbe expressions of the language
faculty, even if these expressions are marked as ungrammatical. On this view, we can
have thoughts which are themselves ill formed, just as we can produce expressions
which are ill formed. What is ruled out is having thoughts which the language faculty
cannot even produce. We can thus distinguish two kinds of ungrammaticality. One
kind involves the production of a full-fledged syntactic structure which is somehow
‘marked’ as ungrammatical.51 The other involves a complete failure to even produce
a structure. It seems that ungrammatical but acceptable sentences of the latter sort
pose a deeper worry for the proposed identification of thought and language. If we
can understand an utterance which cannot even be generated by the language faculty,
it seems there must be some extra-linguistic medium which can serve as a vehicle
for thought. But if the examples are ungrammatical in the former way, the language
faculty will produce a vehicle for such thoughts, although it will indicate that this
vehicle is in some way ill formed.
I have so far stated this response in the terms of GB theory. Doing so in the terms of
the contemporary Minimalist Program is slightly more complicated. ‘Filters’ in this
program have largely been replaced by ‘interface conditions’, demands imposed on
the outputs of the language faculty which ensure that they are ‘legible’ by the semantic
and phonological systems which are used to interpret and externalize the products of
the language faculty. Standard Minimalist accounts of movement treat it as arising out
of the need to remove uninterpretable features, i.e. properties of lexical items which
50 Centrally, that generation of sentence 30 requires generation of 29 as an earlier stage in its derivation.
51 This kind of ungrammaticality fits together rather nicely with the account of ungrammaticality as an
‘error-signal’ proposed in Gross (forthcoming).
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result in failures at the interfaces. Case, for example, is viewed as an uninterpretable
feature of arguments (DP or NP, depending on the theory) which gets deleted when
the argument expression is in a local relation to a Tense expression. This will motivate
movement when arguments originate within verb phrases (see fn. 38) which cannot
perform this function of eliminating uninterpretable features.52 Similar accounts are
given of other agreement phenomena such as gender and number.53
Whether this Minimalist re-interpretation of what were traditionally viewed as fil-
ters can re-instate the traditional distinction between two forms of ungrammaticality
depends on how we interpret the claim that unchecked/undeleted features are uninter-
pretable by the interfaces. At face value, this would seem to undermine the proposal
that such cases of ungrammaticality involve merely ‘marking’ these structures as defi-
cient in some way. If they are literally uninterpretable, especially by the semantic
interface, then it seems that we cannot rescue IH by saying that such sentences can be
interpreted despite being ungrammatical. However, it is not clear that one should read
this term so strongly.54 Sentences like 29 are interpretable, in the everyday sense of the
term, despite being recognized as ill formed. I thus suggest that we ought read ‘uninter-
pretability’ at the interfaces as exactly in line with the account of traditional filter vio-
lations given above: uninterpretable expressions can be assigned meanings, and so can
serve as vehicles for thought, although they are marked as grammatically defective.55
On the other side of this distinction between kinds of grammaticality, some expres-
sions do seem to be genuinely ruled out by Minimalist accounts of the language
faculty; not merely in that they are ‘uninterpretable’, in the sense just identified, but
that they cannot even be constructed. Economy constraints, principles governing the
workings of the language faculty which ensure that its operations are maximally com-
putationally efficient, seem to operate in this way. The Subjacency Constraint, which
provides a limit on the distance (defined structurally) an expression can be moved by
a single operation, is motivated on the grounds that allowing the system to perform
long-distance movement would create too substantial a computational cost.56 Such a
proposal is involved in explaining the difference between the following expressions:
52 The extent to which arguments must undergo such movement is controversial, with extreme positions
like that of Laenzlinger and Soare (2004) insisting that all arguments must be moved from within the VP,
and more moderate positions suggesting that only subjects must be moved. However, it is very widely
agreed that there must be some movement of arguments, and so the problem of which copy is pronounced
arises.
53 Pesetsky andTorrego (2007) provide an analysis of Case and other uninterpretable features along roughly
these lines.
54 And likewise for claims that uninterpretable features cause ‘crashes’ at the interfaces.
55 Yet another empirical wrinkle in all of this is the recent program of ‘Crash-Proof Syntax’, which aims
to show that the language faculty never produces uninterpretable expressions (see Frampton and Gutmann
2002). If such a proposal is correct, then the distinction between kinds of grammaticality will not be
available, as no ungrammatical expressions will be generated.
56 The rough idea is that the syntactic structure is constructed bottom-up, andmovement from ‘lower down’
in the tree is motivated by the need to check features higher up. If long-distance movement were allowed,
the construction would have to retain access to all lower-down structure, in case some element anywhere
in the structure was a suitable target for such feature-driven movement. By insisting that all movement
proceed in short steps, the construction of the structure can ‘forget’ about all structure except that in the
immediate vicinity of the most recently added element. This drastically reduces the computational cost of
constructing a syntactic representation. See Chomsky (2008) for a discussion of this framework.
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31. What did [IP Rahim claim [CP that [IP he read ]]]?
32. *What did [IP Rahim believe [NP the claim [CP that [IP he read]]] ?
If movement is restricted so that it can cross at most one ‘bounding node’ (in English,
IP or NP)57 at a time, we can explain the above pattern. In 31, there are two IPs that
must be crossed, but the wh-expression can make this movement in two steps, each of
which crosses only one. ‘What’ can first move to the specifier of the embedded CP, as
marked by the intermediate struckout ‘what’, and then to the sentence-initial position
in which it is pronounced, and so no ‘long-distance’ movement is needed. However,
in 32, while the wh-expression can legitimately move initially to the embedded CP,
from there it must move to the sentence-initial position. But to do so would involve
crossing two bounding nodes (the embedded NP and the matrix IP), and there is no
intermediate ‘landing site’ which could be used to break up this journey. This thus
explains the acceptability of 31 and the unacceptability of the otherwise quite similar
32.
Subjacency, and other constraints resulting from economy considerations, are
ungrammatical in a stronger sense than violations of filters/interface conditions. It is a
crucial part of the explanatory strategy of theMinimalist Program that such constraints
prevent representations which would violate them from being constructed in the first
place.58 This is reflected in the more extreme unacceptability responses they generate.
Whereas one can assign a meaning to 29 despite its obvious unacceptability, sentences
like 32 are typically genuinely uninterpretable (in the non-technical sense). This fact
provides further motivation for IH, as identifying thought and language enables us to
explain the distribution of acceptability in ungrammatical sentences. Ungrammatical
but acceptable sentences may involve the generation of structures which are subse-
quently marked as ungrammatical. Despite this marking, the fact that the structures
are produced provides a possible vehicle for thought. However, when a sentence is
ungrammatical in virtue of not even being generable, there is no vehicle for thought
present and thus the sentence cannot be interpreted at all.
However, when sentences which are predicted to not even be generable are
nonetheless interpretable, this poses a particularly deep problem for the proposed
identification. The reading of sentence 19 where ‘every language’ takes wide scope
appears to be of this sort. The constraint on extraction from relative clauses is typically
analyzed as a subjacency violation.59 This suggests that the interpretability of expres-
sions like this, under readings which violate the subjacency constraint, are seriously
problematic for IH, as the thoughts they seem to convey are not even producible by the
language faculty. On the other hand, sentence 19 is somewhat marginal, so we may
57 For the purposes of this paper, I amassuming that arguments areNPs rather thanDPs.This is for simplicity
and for consistency with discussions of historical statements of rules like the Case Filter. Nothing should
turn on this issue. For the origin of the idea that arguments are headed by determiners, not nouns, see Abney
(1987).
58 The gains in computational efficiency allowed by economy constraints rely on the claim that the
computationally inefficient operations are never even attempted, not just that when they are they lead
to uninterpretability at the interface.
59 In sentence 21, [who speaks which language] is an IP and [a teacher who speaks which language] is an
NP, and both must be crossed. The Specifier of the CP intervening between these expressions could serve
as a landing site for an intermediate movement, except that the subject of the embedded IP ‘who’ is already
occupying this space, as a result of raising for Case assignment.
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not wish to place too heavy an argumentative burden on sentences of this sort, which
would be good news for IH.
While I believe these strategies are reasonably exhaustive, I don’t wish to commit
to the claim that there are no other options for handling acceptable but ungrammatical
expressions from the perspective of IH. The aim of this section is just to stress the
ways in which a defense of this proposal relies on the outcome of several ongoing
debates in the linguistics literature. If IH is to be successfully defended, I believe it
will involve a combination of at least all of the strategies covered in this section.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have hoped to show that the Identification Hypothesis is not as implau-
sible as is often thought. In particular, once it is recognized that the relata in the
purported identification relation are the language of thought and human I-language,
many of the traditional problems with the view disappear. I also raised a novel obstacle
to defending this proposal, acceptable but ungrammatical expressions, and pointed to
several strategies for responding to worries of this sort. It is, at least, an open empirical
question whether natural language, as identified as the target of scientific linguistic
theory, differs from thought in the ways such arguments assume.
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